INTEL POWER GADGET LINUX UPDATE

779391 (FutureTPM).Īdditional funding was provided by generous gifts from Intel, ARM, Amazon and Red Hat. It is partially funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) under grants EP/R012598/1, EP/S030867/1 and by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. It has also been supported by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) via the project ESPRESSO, which is funded by the province of Styria and the Business Promotion Agencies of Styria and Carinthia. It was also supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 681402). The research presented in this paper was supported by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) via the K-project DeSSnet, which is funded in the context of COMET - Competence Centers for Excellent Technologies by BMVIT, BMWFW, Styria, and Carinthia. What about other processor vendors (ARM, AMD, etc.)? Instead of actual energy measurements, it falls back to a model-based approach, such that same instructions with different data or operands can not be distinguished. Therefore, Intel released microcode updates that change the way the energy consumption is reported if Intel SGX is enabled on the system. With Intel SGX, however, a compromised operating system is within the threat model, rendering this mitigation insufficient.

INTEL POWER GADGET LINUX UPDATE

To mitigate PLATYPUS, the unprivileged access to the energy consumption has been revoked with an update to the operating system. In addition, we distinguish different Hamming weights of operands or memory loads, threatening constant-time implementations of cryptographic algorithms. We demonstrate this by recovering AES keys from the side-channel resilient AES-NI implementation, as well as RSA keys from an Intel SGX enclave. We show that in addition to distinguishing different keys, it is possible to reconstruct entire cryptographic keys. Our research shows that the Intel RAPL interface can be exploited in way more threatening scenarios. established a covert channel by modulating the energy consumption of the DRAM. showed that it is possible to distinguish if different cryptographic keys have been processed by the CPU. Previous work already showed limited information leakage caused by the Intel RAPL interface. With interfaces like Intel RAPL, physical access is not required anymore as the measurements can be accessed directly from software. Using an oscilloscope, the attacker monitors the energy consumption of the device. With classical power side-channel attacks, an attacker typically has physical access to a victim device. Using this technique, we recover RSA keys processed by mbed TLS from an SGX enclave. In our work, we combine PLATYPUS with precise execution control of SGX-Step.Īs a result, we overcome the hurdle of the limited measuring capabilities of Intel RAPL by repeatedly executing single instructions inside the SGX enclave. With SGX, Intel released a security feature to create isolated environments, so-called enclaves, that are secure even if the operating system is compromised. PLATYPUS can further infer intra-cacheline control flow of applications, break KASLR, leak AES-NI keys from Intel SGX enclaves and the Linux kernel, and establish a timing-independent covert channel.

Using PLATYPUS, we demonstrate that we can observe variations in the power consumption to distinguish different instructions and different Hamming weights of operands and memory loads, allowing inference of loaded values. Likewise to the Platypus that uses its ability to find food even in complete darkness, we sense secrets in the processor's energy measurements using Intel RAPL.

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Intel power gadget linux